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Abstract 
The Millennium Development Goals included a target to halve the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015 – a right recognized as fundamental 
to human needs.   Small independent water vendors are often the only water supply option in 
peri-urban neighbourhoods in developing countries and fill a critical gap in the municipal 
system, but there is concern about the quality and price of their water. Such vendors need to 
be recognized and regulated due to their role in meeting basic water needs. This article 
reflects on the lack of regulation and discusses a recent multidisciplinary research project in 
Kenya and Ethiopia that considered whether there is a case for regulation of competition, 
price and quality.  It concludes that recognizing small independent water vendors as part of a 
regulatory framework will result in increased access to water for the poor and assist in the 
realization of the MDGs; the right to water; and, intergenerational equity. 
                                                             
* African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
(mulugetaA@uneca.org; mm.ayalew@gmail.com. 
 
** Centre for Environmental Strategy, University of Surrey. (j.chenoweth@surrey.ac.uk). 
 
*** Environmental Regulatory Research Group, School of Law, University of Surrey 
(r.malcolm@surrey.ac.uk). 
 
**** Centre for Environmental Strategy, University of Surrey. (y.mulugetta@surrey.ac.uk). 
***** School of Spatial Planning and Natural Resource Management, Bondo University College Kenya  
(lgokotto@yahoo.com). 
 
****** Robens Centre for Public and Environmental Health, Faculty of Engineering and Physical Science, 
University of Surrey  (s.pedley@surrey.ac.uk). 
2 
 
Keywords: water vendors; water quality regulation; Millennium Development Goals; right to 
water; Kenya; Ethiopia. 
1. Introduction 
Deprivations in water and sanitation lie at the core of poverty:           
          Some 1.8 million child deaths each year as a result of diarrhoea…Together, unclean water 
and poor sanitation are the world’s second biggest killer of children. Deaths from diarrhoea in 
2004 were some six times greater than the average annual deaths in armed conflict for the 1990s. 
The loss of 443 million school days each year from water-related illnesses…Close to half of all 
people in developing countries suffering at any given time from a health problem caused by 
water and sanitation deficits... Millions of women spending several hours a day collecting 
water… Lifecycles of disadvantage affecting millions of people, with illness and lost educational 
opportunities in childhood leading to poverty in adulthood...1 
The human cost of lack of access to safe drinking water and sanitation is plain to see from 
these raw statistics.  Beyond that basic fact, lie the economic impacts of such inadequate 
provision on Gross Domestic Product.2 
 
The backdrop for this article – and for the multidisciplinary research project carried out by 
the authors and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 3 which is explained below - is the impact of 
                                                             
1 UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the 
Global Water Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 6.  See also the UN Development Programme, Human 
Development Report 2011, Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) which 
demonstrates the continuing link between dirty water and inequality; and, WHO/UNICEF, Global Water Supply 
and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund 2000) 
2 – 3.  
2 The economic impact in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to be a loss of about 5% of GDP – an amount that 
exceeded total aid and debt relief in 2003. UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006 (n 
1) 6. 
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the Millennium Development Goals4 (MDGs) on improving the quality of life for the world’s 
poor and vulnerable, in particular, by improving their access to safe drinking water.  At the 
United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, world leaders agreed on a set of Goals 5 to be 
achieved by the year 2015. These followed the Millennium Declaration that was adopted as a 
General Assembly resolution – a non-legally binding recommendation.6   In a speech in 2010, 
the Goals were described by the UN Secretary-General as ‘… a promise — a declaration of 
collective responsibility for the world’s poor and vulnerable, a pledge to build decent, 
healthier lives for billions of people.’7  The MDGs are a set of eight goals consisting of 32 
target indicators that represent ‘progress on a range of economic and social indicators’.8 
These goals motivate and mobilise development efforts and are a means of measuring the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
3 ‘Regulatory Frameworks for Independent Water Providers in Kenya and Ethiopia’, Leverhulme Trust (Grant 
participants: University of Surrey, UK; Grant number: F00242F). 
4 UNICEF, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Annual Report 2009 (UNICEF WASH Section Programmes 2010). 
5 As announced by the UN Secretary General in his report to the 61st General Assembly in 2006. For further 
details of the Millennium Development Goals, see <www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml> accessed 6 
October 2013. 
6 Binding decisions on all members can only be taken by the Security Council (Article 25, UN Charter); and see, 
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, OUP 2012) 189. For a discussion on 
whether the MDGs now form customary international law see: Gobind Nankani, John Page and Lindsay Judge 
‘Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies: Moving Towards Convergence?’ in Philip Alston and Mary 
Robinson (eds), Human Rights and Development, Towards Mutual Reinforcement (OUP 2005) 475-498; and 
Marie von Engelhardt, ’The Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights at 2010 – An Account of the 
Millennium Summit Outcome’, (2010) 2 Goettingen J of Intl L1129. 
7 Ban Ki-moon, ‘Alpbach Speech’, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon’s speech to the European Forum on 
The International Financial Crisis and the Millennium Development Goals.  (Alpbach, 4 September, UN Doc 
SG/SM/13087 DEV/2808, 7 September 2010). 
8 William Easterly, ‘How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa’ (2009) 37 World 
Development 26, 26. 
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performance of countries.  As part of the development agenda, the MDGs are not specifically 
based on human rights although the rhetoric of human rights flows through the development 
discourse.9 
 
Goal 7 of the MDGs seeks to achieve environmental sustainability, and Target 7c of this goal 
is, by 2015, to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water. In response to the need to monitor international progress towards target 7c, 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNICEF collaborated to form the Joint 
Monitoring Programme (JMP), whose role it is to collect, analyse and report access data 
gathered from participating countries. The JMP reports progress every two years.10  Target 7c 
is more formidable for some regions and countries. For example, sub-Saharan African 
countries need to reduce by half the number of people without access from 45 percent. This 
would require doubling the annual investment in water supply from the historical level of 
US$15 to US$30 billion.11 The enormity of the task required in these low-income countries 
becomes clearer when constraining factors, such as urbanisation and general population 
growth, are taken into account.12 It is also likely that this underestimates the true extent of the 
                                                             
9 Engelhardt,  (n 6); Philip Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and 
Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Q 
755. 
10 See <http://www.wssinfo.org/> accessed 6 October 2013. 
11 Aldo Baietti and Peter Raymond, ‘Financing Water Supply and Sanitation Investments: Utilizing Risk 
Mitigation Instruments to Bridge the Financing Gap’ (2005) 4 World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation Sector 
Board Discussion Paper Series, 1 <http://ppi.worldbank.org/resources/ppi_otherresources.aspx?resourceId=6 > 
accessed 6 October 2013. 
12 Richard Carter and Kerstin Danert, ‘The Private Sector and Water and Sanitation Services: Policy and Poverty 
Issues’ (2003) 15 J of International Development 1067, 1068. 
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problem as these figures do not take into account wider sector management costs as well as 
operational activities and the maintenance costs of existing capital stocks.13 
 
For most people in the industrialised world, access to safe drinking water means turning on a 
tap at home or at work and receiving unlimited quantities of clean water. But the definition of 
‘adequate or reasonable’ access to improved water sources is at a much lower standard than 
that and is considered to be when at least 20 litres (the amount of water needed to satisfy 
metabolic, hygienic, and domestic requirements) of safe water (water free from biological or 
chemical agents at concentration levels directly detrimental to health) per day are available 
within one kilometre of the dwelling (the distance measured from a house to a public stand 
post or any other improved drinking water source).14   The source of the water is also critical 
to the definition and improved water sources include: household connection, public 
standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring and rainwater collection.15   This 
represents a limited range of supplies and other sources such as vendor-provided water, 
tanker truck provision of water, unprotected well, unprotected spring and bottled water are 
not regarded as ‘improved sources’.16  Because of the difficulty of measuring access to safe 
water directly (and perhaps also because of the difficulty in defining what is meant by safety) 
                                                             
13 Meera Mehta, Thomas Fugelsnes and Kameel Virjee, ‘Financing the Millennium Development Goals for 
Water and Sanitation: What Will it Take?’ (2005) 21 Water Resources Development 239, 240. 
14 WHO/UNICEF, Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (WHO/UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation, 2000) 77; UN indicators: Proportion of population 
using improved water sources <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3a665> accessed 17 
February 2013.  WHO, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality: Incorporating First and Second Addenda (3rd 
ed, WHO 2008).  
15  WHO/UNICEF (n 14) 77. 
16  ibid 77. 
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many organisations use an indirect way of measuring safety through access to improved 
sources - described by the JMP as a ‘proxy indicator’17. This is based on the presumption that 
improved sources are safe.  So, if people get access to such sources that is considered 
equivalent to getting access to safe water.  However, like any other presumption, this is not 
conclusive. For example, piped water is an improved source but may at times be unsafe for 
drinking.18  It should also be noted that the definition of access to improved water sources 
does not measure the reliability of supply. In most developing countries, even having access 
to piped water in the house is not a guarantee of water security – piped water is not available 
‘24/7’.  For those in informal slum settlements without piped supplies who rely on small 
independent water vendors, the position is plainly far more precarious. 
 
With respect to drinking water, in its latest report (the 2012 update report) the JMP has 
announced that, on the basis of this criterion of access to improved sources, the MDG target 
has been met19.  But, the global figures for those lacking access to improved water sources 
are based on limited data and presumptions and it is likely that the position might be worse 
than the estimates. The figures are difficult to quantify and satisfaction of the MDGs remains 
                                                             
17 WHO/ UNICEF, Drinking Water: Equity, Safety and Sustainability: Thematic Report on Drinking Water 
(Joint Monitoring Programme for Drinking Water and Sanitation 2011) 11. 
18 Robert Bain and others ,  ‘Accounting for Water Quality in Monitoring Access to Safe Drinking-Water as Part 
of the Millennium Development Goals: Lessons from Five Countries.’ (2012) 90 Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization,228; Aldo Baietti, and Peter Raymond, ‘Financing Water Supply and Sanitation Investments: 
Utilizing Risk Mitigation Instruments to Bridge the Financing Gap’ (2005) 4 World Bank Water Supply and 
Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series, 1 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/resources/ppi_otherresources.aspx?resourceId=6  accessed 6 October 2013. 
19 UNICEF and the World Health Organization, Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2012 Update, 
(WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation 2012). 
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controversial.20   The figures underestimate the extent of the problem as they do not measure 
the reliability and quality of piped services;21 real service coverage figures are worse in some 
countries and for some groups of people such as low-income people in urban areas;22 and, the 
estimates cover only 90 percent of the global population.23 
 
Poverty is linked with lack of access to a secure and safe source of water24  and typifies 
informal settlements which, in the developing world continue to grow with the number of 
slum dwellers expanding from 767 million in 2000 to 828 million in 2010.25  These are 
concentrated in key parts of the world: in sub-Saharan Africa, where this research project was 
undertaken, 62% of the urban population was living in slums in 2010.26  This raises questions 
of sustainable development and intergenerational equity27 coupled with the right to water as 
an international and, in some cases, constitutional, human right. 28  The linkage between 
                                                             
20   Bain and others (n 18). 
21 Baietti and Raymond  (n 11) 1. 
22 Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan, ‘Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the Point? 
Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America’ (2003) 15 Environment and Urbanization 87, 88; and Carter 
and Danert (n 12) 1068. 
23 Terence Lee and Vinio Floris, ‘Universal Access to Water and Sanitation: Why the Private Sector Must 
Participate’ (2003) 27 Natural Resources Forum 279, 279-280. 
24 Philippe Cullet, Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India (OUP 2009)10. 
25 United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs 2010)  
26 ibid. 
27 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987) 43. 
28 The right to water appears in a number of constitutions.  See, for example, Article 43(1)(d) of the Constitution 
of Kenya (Revised edition: 2010, National Council of Law Reporting, Kenya, 2010): ‘every person has the right 
to clean and safe water in adequate quantities’; and, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 1994, 
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sustainable development, human rights and the development priority is plain.  Individuals in 
Ethiopia and Kenya, the case study countries in the research project, have a right to water 
based on their national constitutions29; the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)30; and, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) 31  as interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR)32. The relevant interpretations of the CESCR are contained in General Comment 
No. 15 on the right to water33. There are also other international human rights instruments 
specifically dealing with the right to water, albeit with respect to specified groups such as 
women and children34. But, as is evidenced by the large numbers deprived of adequate 
supplies of safe drinking water, a gap lies between the right as formulated in international and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Proclamation No 1/1995, Article 90: ‘To the extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall aim to provide 
all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food and social security’. 
29 ibid.  
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
31 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). (adopted 16 December 1966, 
enteredinto force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
32 Salman MA Salman and Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, ‘The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy 
Dimensions’ (Law, Justice, and Development Series, The World Bank 2004). 
33 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (which monitors the interpretations of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Political and Social Rights) , General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water’ (Articles 
11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc.  E/C. 12/2002/11 
(2003). 
34 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)  (adopted on 
18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 and Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990) 1577. 
UNTS 3 (CRC). Whether the right to water is a derivative or stand-alone right is debatable. See Eric Bluemel 
’The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water’ (2004) 31 Ecology LQ 957, 963. 
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national laws, and the extent to which citizens are empowered to demand the fulfilment of 
that right in practical provision and services. Access to safe drinking water is not a personal 
choice and the gaps in water supply infrastructure must be filled in one form or another – 
human beings must have water to survive.  The challenge to meet this need and right of the 
slum dwellers to improve the supply of water as posed by the MDGs, encompasses not just 
engineering solutions, but also consideration of the structure for the water industry together 
with its regulation.  In developing countries, municipal piped systems neither reach all the 
population nor provide secure access to those they do reach.  In practice, in developing 
countries, the gaps in infrastructure are filled by small independent water providers (SIPs) 
who operate at the periphery of the formal municipal systems.35 The epitome of micro and 
small enterprises, they provide an essential stop-gap.  But, they are usually viewed as just that 
– stop-gaps until municipal systems catch up.  Frequently viewed as undesirable with a 
precarious position in the hierarchy of water supply, they tend not to be recognised by law or 
operate illegally.  Operating outside regulatory frameworks, they are consequently vulnerable 
to enforcement action leading to closure; lack of investment and property opportunities; and, 
lack of opportunities for education in public health requirements and good practice 
                                                             
35 See, for example, Gordon  McGranahan and others, ‘How Small Water Enterprises Can Contribute to the 
Millennium Development Goals: Evidence from Dar es Salaam. Nairobi, Khartoum and Accra’ (Series: Small 
Water Enterprises, Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC), Loughborough University, UK 
2006); Suzanne Snell, ‘Water and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor: Small-Scale Providers Typology and 
Profiles’ (UNDP-World Bank Water & Sanitation Program 1998); Tova Maria Solo, ‘Small-scale Entrepreneurs 
in the Urban Water and Sanitation Market’ (1999) 11 Environment and Urbanization 117; Water and Sanitation 
Program (WSP) – East Asia and the Pacific, ‘The Experience of Small-Scale Water Providers in Serving the 
Poor in Metro Manila’ (Field Note, WSP, 2004) ; and Adriana Allen, Julio D Dávina and Pascale Hofmann, 
‘The Peri-Urban Water Poor: Citizens or Consumers?’ (2006) 18 Environment and Urbanization 333; Esther 
Gerlach and Richard Franceys, ‘Regulating Water Services for the Poor: the Case of Amman’ (2009) 40 
Geoforum 431. 
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concerning safe water. Yet, their position in the water supply hierarchy is critical to the 
fulfilment of the right to water. It is reported that these providers are not accorded the 
recognition and support that is given to official providers; that they charge higher prices than 
the official providers; and, that the quality of water is very poor.36 Legal frameworks rarely 
exist for regulating competition, price and quality of water provided by SIPs. However, at a 
minimum, according to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights the human 
right to water requires the government to establish a regulatory framework that has the 
objective, among others, of ensuring that water services provided by third parties such as 
SIPs are safe and affordable.37 Therefore, the right to water arguably requires all governments 
in developing countries where SIPs operate to set up and enforce a legal framework for their 
regulation 
 
In the research project carried out by the authors 38 , the formal integration of SIPs in 
developing countries into technical, policy and legal frameworks as a means of increasing 
access to safe and affordable drinking water (and thereby improving the chances of achieving 
the MDG target and giving effect to their human right) was investigated. Given the 
importance of SIPs in providing a supply of water which generally improves access, the 
research project set out to investigate their position in the regulatory frameworks in two case 
study areas and to enquire as to whether the current approach to SIPs was antipathetic to the 
achievement of the MDGs’ objective of improving access to safe water together with 
fulfilment of the human right. We first consider the role of SIPs in achieving target 7c of the 
Goals, and then report on the research project which examined the role of SIPs in two African 
                                                             
36 McGranahan and others (n35). 
37 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 15 (n 33) Article 24. 
38  (n 3). 
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cities and analyse the rationale and importance of bringing SIPs within regulatory 
frameworks to increase access to safe water. 
 
2. Small Independent Water Providers 
 
SIPs comprise a variety of different types of vendors. The patterns of business models 
examined in the two contrasting case study areas in the research project aptly exemplify the 
varieties of SIPs operating worldwide and are explained here as a working demonstration of 
the concept. For example, in Kisumu, Kenya, standpipe operators are connected to the 
official water supply network and operate under contract with the supplier, selling water from 
water kiosks at a flat rate tariff. Other vendors re-sell water from the official network to 
which they are connected and operate without contracts.  They do not, therefore, benefit from 
the flat rate charged by the official supplier. Standpipe operators may sell directly to the 
consumer, or to mobile water vendors who deliver water to the households. In some 
instances, contracted standpipe operators are entering into delegated management models 
with the official utility, the Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (KIWASCO), under 
which they take responsibility for extending the piped water network.  Well and borehole 
operators dig wells or sink boreholes and sell directly to consumers and to mobile water 
vendors. They do not have contracts with KIWASCO and are usually operating at a micro 
scale with many owners operating single or a small number of wells that they have dug on 
their own land. So this water is not coming from a municipal supply and is very likely to 
show high levels of contamination and not be suitable for drinking (see Table 2 below).  In 
Kisumu, there is also a single mini-utility that is abstracting water from Nyamasaria River to 
a treatment plant and then selling it to consumers and mobile water vendors.  This facility 
operates under permit from the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) and 
12 
 
asserts the existence of an agreement with the Lake Victoria South Water Services Board 
(LVSWSB) to supply water until KIWASCO extends its water supply infrastructure.  Mobile 
water vendors include handcart pushers and tanker trucks. They purchase water from all 
sources and move it round the city in search of customers. The duty to monitor water rests 
with KIWASCO.  Plainly this duty will not be fulfilled in relation to the numerous SIPs 
operating illegally. 
 
In Addis Ababa, SIPs do not operate in the same way as in Kisumu as they all rely on the 
official water providers for bulk water supply.  The supervision of the water supply falls to 
the official provider – the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA). One form 
of SIPs are called ‘public fountains’ which are kebelle39-managed communal water collection 
points operated by individuals employed by local administrators.  Another form of SIPs is 
owned and operated by community groups who pool their resources to get a public standpipe.  
Most common are neighbour sellers and water kiosks that have no special relationship with 
the AAWSA and are often to be found in grocery shops.  They are re-selling the water they 
receive through their own private connection.  Mobile water vendors transport water by 
donkey or car.  These, together with the water kiosks and neighbour sellers are operating in 
violation of the law as they have no permits from AAWSA. 
 
So, SIPs include standpipe operators (either officially recognized or not) who purchase water 
from the official water utility and then re-sell this water either directly to consumers or to 
mobile vendors; well and borehole operators selling either directly to consumers or to mobile 
vendors; and, the mobile vendors who purchase water from the standpipes and wells to resell 
                                                             
39 The kebelle is a controlling group in the local community. 
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to consumers.  These types of SIPs are common throughout the developing world in the 
countries primarily targeted by the MDGs. 
SIPs perform a vital role in that, for most people living in towns in developing countries, their 
domestic water supply is dominated not by the official water utilities but by SIPs.40 There is a 
stark contrast in provision between industrialized countries, where water mainly comes 
through the tap from highly regulated water treatment plants and these poor urban areas, 
where water comes from mixed sources. Many households may have connections to 
municipal supplies but even there, discontinuity of supply frequently means that the 
householder must seek alternative or supplementary supplies and this usually means reliance 
on SIPs. For informal peri-urban settlements, connections are less usual and there they 
depend almost entirely on SIPs.  As described above, these vendors obtain their water supply 
from a mixture of sources – some improved and some unimproved - but for many, SIPs 
complete the cycle of water supply creating a virtual piped network.  Yet their critical role in 
bringing drinking water to the un-served majority is rarely acknowledged by authorities.  For 
instance, according to the JMP,41 water supplied by SIPs is not considered an improved water 
source, partly because of the lack of regulatory frameworks in most countries to ensure the 
safety and supply of water, but also due to its lack of affordability.42 A 2002 World Bank 
report stated that in cities ‘in the developing world the un-served poor pay ten or more times 
                                                             
40 Bernard Collignon & Mark Vezina, ‘Independent Water and Sanitation Providers in African Cities, Full 
Report of a 10 Country Study’ (UNDP / World Bank Water and Sanitation Program 2000);  Marianne Kjellen, 
‘Complementary Water Systems in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania: the Case of Water Vending’ (2000) 16 Intl J of 
Water Resources Development 143;  Veena Srinivasan, Steven M Gorelick, & Lawrence Goulder, ‘Sustainable 
Urban Water Supply in South India: Desalination, Efficiency Improvement, or Rainwater Harvesting?’ (2010) 
46 Water Resources Research W10504. 
41 WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (n 14). 
42 ibid.  
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the price for a liter of water than is paid by their fellow citizens who are served with formal 
supplies’.43  The Asian Development Bank44 noted that Asia’s urban poor using SIPs pay 20 
to 40 times more per litre than water consumers with a municipal connection. UNICEF states 
that in urban slums many people are forced to pay exorbitant prices to SIPs for inadequate 
quantities of water that are often contaminated.45 These vendors, however, are often the only 
water supply option in many poor and peri-urban neighborhoods, as well as providing 
supplementary water to middle-income households when services provided by the official 
utility are inadequate or fail. It is clear that the existence of SIPs results from a failure by the 
official utility suppliers to provide an adequate supply. These vendors, by filling this gap, are 
providing an essential service. 
 
Despite this significant role played by SIPs, in many countries they operate illegally either 
because they sell water where trading is prohibited, or because they operate below the 
quantitative limits prescribed by regulation. Whether they are operating legally or otherwise, 
the regulations are generally not effectively enforced so as to achieve affordable water of an 
adequate and consistent standard.  There are a number of reasons why SIPs fail to gain 
recognition within the legal systems, but their existence may well be a consequence of an 
underlying malaise in the utilities that could be resolved by investment and capacity 
                                                             
43   The World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic Directions for World Bank Engagement, 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /World Bank 2004). 
44 Asian Development Bank, ‘Should Asia's urban poor pay for water?’ In Water For All Water Briefs, 2006 
<http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2006/water-brief-should-poor-pay.pdf > accessed 10 July 
2013. 
45 UNICEF, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Annual Report 2009 (UNICEF Wash Section 2010). 
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building46  with the right political will and social infrastructure. For the time being, this 
political will is not apparent and while that situation remains, SIPs will continue to operate 
with or without legal recognition. Whatever the reason for this lack of legal recognition, it 
generally results in SIPs remaining outside formal regulatory frameworks controlling quality 
and price, as well as discouraging investment due to the lack of investment security47.  Such 
lack of controls leave SIPs vulnerable to the very real accusation that the water they supply is 
of poor and/or inconsistent quality and is exorbitantly priced. 
 
 It is necessary to examine the role played by SIPs in meeting the water supply needs of 
residents of peri-urban and poor urban districts before assessing how these vendors can be 
effectively regulated given the limitations of regulatory authorities. The challenge of 
regulation is to provide effective protection for the consumer while, at the same time, not 
prematurely discouraging SIPs from pursuing their business. While SIPs may not, in the 
opinion of some, be the ideal water source for most households (and given the choice and 
ability to pay, most households would opt for a piped water supply) optimizing the services 
provided by SIPs is still critically important. It may also be arguable that their existence 
needs to be regulated to enhance their long term position in the hierarchy of water supply. It 
is likely that the current social and political structures will continue in the foreseeable future 
in many developing countries, thus precluding the extension and reliability of municipal 
infrastructural development.  Households using the services of these vendors do not generally 
have a choice and thus while extending and improving the affordability of municipal supply 
systems should remain a medium to long term goal, improving regulation to ensure improved 
                                                             
46 David Schaub-Jones,‘Market-based approaches in water and sanitation: the role of entrepreneurship’ (2011) 
30 Waterlines 5. 
47 Collignon & Vézina (n 37). 
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water safety and affordability from SIPs is still an immediate priority and an urgent matter for 
public health concerns. Reducing the disease burden of this segment of society is an 
important potential benefit of regulation that may be achievable at relatively minimal cost.  In 
seeking to continue to improve upon Target 7c of the MDGs, it is important to bring into the 
forefront the role played by these vendors. 
3. The Research Project:  Kisumu, Kenya and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
The role played by SIPs and regulatory options for these water suppliers was explored by 
focusing upon the two case studies chosen for the research project: Kisumu, Kenya and Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.  By mapping out the legal frameworks for the regulation of SIPs in Ethiopia 
and Kenya, the research determined the extent to which their activity is regulated by the state. 
The research also aimed to find out if there is any case for regulation of competition among 
SIPs and the price and quality of water they are providing.  Finally, one of the objectives was 
to make a critical analysis of the way they are currently regulated and to consider whether 
regulating SIPs was desirable in support of the achievement of the relevant MDGs in 
improving access to safe water and in operationalizing the right to water.  
Kisumu and Addis Ababa are two examples of African cities that show how difficult it can be 
to assess progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Many households in these cities use multiple sources of water depending upon 
availability, distance and cost. While the preference for the householder is bound to be to take 
water from their own private connection, frequent failures in supply mean that that is not 
always a choice that can be made.  Using the standpipe may be a necessity, with SIPs 
providing an essential stop-gap service completing the cycle of water availability at all times.  
Kisumu, Kenya is located on the shore of Lake Victoria and has an estimated population of 
more than 500,000. KIWASCO is wholly owned by the Kisumu municipality and is 
contracted to provide water and sewerage services in the city. KIWASCO’s network is 
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estimated to supply just under one half of Kisumu’s population via 17,651 connections48. 
Hence, SIPs of various types play a critical role in meeting the majority of water needs across 
the city.  
 
Addis Ababa, located in the central highlands of Ethiopia, has an estimated population of 
more than three million. AAWSA, an autonomous government body, is charged with 
providing water and sewage services for the city. While some 97 percent of the city’s 
population has some form of access to piped water49, only a minority of residents have 
private water connections. Many residents therefore rely upon shared taps, buying water from 
neighbours who resell their water illegally, or standpipe operators, who may be officially 
recognized by the water authority and legal, or not officially recognized and thus illegal. With 
rapid expansion of the city, newly settled areas are poorly served with long cut-offs to the 
piped water supply being common.  
 
These two case studies were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, Ethiopia and Kenya differ 
significantly in their political and legal systems, thus providing contrasting case studies. 
Ethiopia is a country influenced by a mixed continental legal tradition whereas Kenya is 
largely influenced by the British common law tradition. Ethiopia’s constitution envisages a 
federal ethnic based parliamentary democracy whereas Kenya’s envisages a unitary 
                                                             
48 Water Services Regulatory Board. Impact: A Performance Report of Kenya's Water Services Sector  (Water 
Services Regulatory Board, 2012)  <http://www.wasreb.go.ke/> accessed 10 July 2013. 
49 UN-Habitat for a Better Urban Future, Addis Ababa City Programme, 
<http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=499&cid=3207>  accessed 10 July 2013. 
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presidential democracy. 50  Secondly, Kisumu and Addis Ababa differ markedly in the 
structure of their water sectors and the operation of their SIPs. In Addis Ababa, the water 
authority is part of the municipality and while 97 percent of the water supplied in the city can 
ultimately be traced back to the municipal supply system, a much lower proportion of the 
population has direct access to the municipal system compared to Kisumu. In Kisumu, the 
KIWASCO is a public company owned by the municipality, and while 60 percent of the 
water consumed in the city can be traced back to this company, only 40 percent of 
households have a direct connection to the company’s network51. Approximately 40 percent 
of the water in the city comes from sources independent of the water company.  These 
differences between the two cities provide a basis for investigating the position of SIPs in 
each city, the role they play and the extent to which their position could be usefully brought 
within regulatory frameworks in any urban or peri-urban context.   Thus, this study provided 
valuable lessons for the supply of water in such environments. 
4. Research Methodology 
This was an multidisciplinary project with investigations taking place in relation to water 
quality, the price of water; the socio-economic status of the householders; and, the regulatory 
frameworks for the legal status of SIPs and the enforcement context.   
 
Initially, consultations and discussions in Addis Ababa and Kisumu were carried out with 
representatives of the official water authorities and other stakeholders to establish which 
areas of each city met the criteria of being poorly served or un-served by the official water 
authority and were hence suitable as case studies to explore the role played by SIPs. A two 
                                                             
50 WJ Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 ICLQ 485, 511-512; AJ Ogus, 
‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’ 
(1999) 48 ICLQ 405. 
51 (n 47). 
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level stratification was used in order to determine the availability of drinking water defined 
by social groups.  Water availability defined the first level of stratification and socio-
economic status the second level. Lists of possible target areas were generated and then 
reconnaissance surveys were carried out to identify areas that were poorly served by piped 
water systems with significant use of SIPs.52 In Kisumu, due to the large number of potential 
sites identified based upon the quality of their piped water supply service, two poor and two 
non-poor neighborhoods based upon income levels were selected using Kenyan Central 
Bureau of Statistics census data. The Central Bureau of Statistics stratifies urban areas in 
Kenya into five categories of living standards: upper, lower upper, middle, lower middle, and 
low, with the last two of these categories used to define poor neighborhoods and the other 
three categories used to define non-poor neighborhoods in this study.  
 
Unlike Kisumu, Addis Ababa has predominantly mixed development where poor and non-
poor live cheek by jowl as a result of the city’s history and general lack of urban planning. 
Based on the list of potential neighbourhoods identified as having been poorly served by the 
piped water supply service or having less than 20% of households with a direct tap 
connection, a random sample of five neighbourhoods was selected as case study areas.53 All 
of these were mixed neighbourhoods, but three were predominantly poor and two were 
predominantly non-poor.  
 
The multidisciplinary study broadly had two elements: a water usage study identifying 
sources and quality of water and the socio-legal analysis of the regulatory framework and 
enforcement of quality standards and price.  Over a two year period between 2008 and 2010, 
                                                             
52 Vic Barnett, Sample Survey Principles and Methods (Wiley 2003). 
53 Robert Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (Sage Publications 1995). 
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the water usage study was conducted in the selected case study areas involving semi-
structured interviews, a household survey, focus group discussions,54 sanitary inspections, 
and the monitoring of water quality.55  In Kisumu, the household survey was conducted in 
English or Swahili. Specific targeted households within the case study areas were selected 
using a systematic random sampling procedure.56 In Addis Ababa, the survey was conducted 
in Amharic. There was some difficulty finding willing participants in Addis Ababa due to 
fear by some people that participation could lead to problems - given the illegal nature of 
some of the water reselling activities - and hence endanger the means the household used to 
obtain water. Therefore, starting from a randomly selected sampling point in the case study 
area a referral, or ‘snow ball’, sampling procedure was followed whereby a respondent who 
agreed to participate in the study would in turn help to introduce the researchers to other 
potential respondents who they thought might also be willing to participate in the study.57 
In total, 310 households were surveyed. Households were asked about the sources of the 
water they used and water samples were taken for analysis. Thermotolerant coliforms (TTCs) 
                                                             
54 David Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, (Sage Publications 1997). 
55 18 interviews, 310 household surveys, 3 focus group discussions and 2 stakeholders’ workshops took place.   
The workshops, involving around 100 stakeholders (including the Well Owners’ Association in Kisumu), 
government officials, regulators, water authority officials and the local mayor and other dignitaries, were held in 
Addis Ababa on 22 May 2009 and Kisumu on 27th May 2009. 
56 Sara Arber, ‘Designing Samples’ in Nigel Gilbert (ed), Researching Social Life (Sage Publications 2008). 
57 Gordon McGranhan, Josef Leitman & Charles Surjadi, ‘Understanding Environmental Problems in 
Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods: Broad Spectrum Surveys, Participatory Appraisal and Contingent Valuation. 
(1997) Urban Management Programme Working Paper 16, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm 
<www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Risk-
livelihoods/understanding_environmental_probs_disadv_neighbourhoods.pdf > accessed 6 October 2013; 
Robert Chambers, ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm’ (1994) 22 World 
Development1347 . 
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were used as indicators of the microbiological water quality as the presence of these 
microorganisms can be an indicator that the water has been in contact with human or animal 
faeces. Water samples were collected in sterile containers and stored on ice for transport back 
to the laboratory.  All analyses were carried out within six hours of sample collection. A 
portable water quality test kit (Delagua Ltd, UK) was used to process and incubate the water 
samples to test for TTCs.58  
Samples of water were taken from each point of the supply chain in order to determine at 
which points, if any, contaminants entered the water supply. Further analysis of the supply 
chain focused upon the security of supply, ownership of the infrastructure, the means of 
supply and delivery, employment relations, and ownership of the water itself. A standardized 
questionnaire for each category of provider was developed to reduce interview bias. Sanitary 
inspections were carried out in order to identify likely hazards and risks in relation to fecal 
contamination to which the supplied water was exposed. The methodology employed a 
combination of visual assessment and interviews using questionnaires, including the 
                                                             
58 Briefly, 100ml of water was filtered through 0.45um, 47mm diameter membranes under vacuum.  The filters 
were placed onto pads soaked with Membrane Lauryl Sulfate Broth (MLSB) and incubated at 44 C +/- 0.5 C for 
22 hours. The plates were examined within 15 minutes of being removed from the incubator and all yellow 
colonies of greater than 1mm diameter were counted and recorded as TTC. Appropriate dilutions were made of 
heavily contaminated samples and the final result adjusted to provide the number of colony forming units per 
100ml (cfu/100ml). No further confirmation tests were carried out on the isolates.  The method was broadly 
based on  Standing Committee of Analysts, Environment Agency The Microbiology of Drinking-Water- 
Methods for the Examination of Waters and Associated Materials (Environment Agency 2010) and followed the 
instructions in the Oxfam-DelAgua Water Test Kit Manual (Oxfam 2004).   
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systematic logging of observable faults likely to lead to the degradation of water quality as a 
complement to the actual water quality measurements that were taken.59 
In addition to the water usage study, the second element of the multidisciplinary study was 
carried out involving a legal analysis60 This consisted of doctrinal and documentary research 
to evaluate the law in Kenya and Ethiopia with respect to water supply and SIPs in order to 
identify gaps, inconsistencies and ambiguities within the law.61 Socio-legal analysis was also 
carried out to identify how laws are perceived and enforced, and thus how they affect 
behaviour.62  This socio-legal research consisted of interviews with relevant officials and 
other stakeholders to reveal how written laws correspond with the law as it is applied and 
enforced, as well as the perceptions of these officials of the role played by water vendors.   
The structure of the regulatory systems was analyzed to identify the enforcement mechanisms 
                                                             
59 Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected in relation to the two case study cities. Quantitative data 
were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software, while other 
methods such as content analysis were used for the qualitative data collected. For the quantitative data, 
distributions were defined by the mean, median, and standard deviation as appropriate to the data that were 
being displayed. Statistical tests applied to the quantitative data included the Kolgomorov-Sminorv (K-S) Test 
with Lilliefors correction or Shapiro Wilks Test, Pearson’s Chi-square Test (χ2), Kurshkall Wallis Test, 
Wilcoxon Singed-Rank Test, Kendall’s Tau Test, Man Whitney Test, Spearman’s rank (r2) correlation, and 
Friedman’s ANOVA (χ2F) Test. The microbiological water quality data were non-normal and even by 
transforming them to log values it was determined using the K-S and Shapiro Wilks tests that these data did not 
follow a log normal distribution. 
60 Mike McConville & Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh UP 2007); David Stott, Legal 
Research, (2nd edn, Cavendish 1999); John W Cresswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches (2nd edn, Sage 2003). 
61 Anthony Bradney, ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’ (1998) 25 JLS  71; Roger Cotterrell, Law’s Community: 
Legal Theory in Sociological Perspectives (OUP 1995). 
62 Reza Banakar & Max Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005). 
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and practices. This involved interviews with the national ministries, the local councils, the 
water utilities and companies.  The business supply chain was analyzed to identify the nature 
and legal basis of the business relationships including ownership and contractual issues, 
property rights to water, licensing and permissive operational controls. This involved 
interviews with the stakeholders in the supply chain as well as the officials in control of the 
regulatory enforcement framework. 
5. Results 
In both case study areas the average household size was five members (range: 1 to 18 
household members). The overwhelming majority of respondents had at least some formal 
education, with 45.1 percent having just primary education, and 46.0 percent having both 
primary and secondary education. 3.5 percent had some form of post-secondary education 
while 5.3 percent had no formal education. Although non-poor areas formed part of the study, 
the results showed that, in fact, the majority of respondents could be considered poor since 
only 27.4 percent of households had incomes above the official recognized poverty lines of 
Kenya of 10000 Kenyan Shillings ($US150) or Ethiopia of 1075 Ethiopian Birr ($US110).  
This indicated that within our own sample, poverty levels crossed the classification of poor 
and non-poor neighbourhoods. 
In Addis Ababa, 51.4 percent of households used a public water tap or standpipe as their 
primary water source. Twenty percent obtained water from a connected neighbour or other 
form of household resale of water, 14.3 percent obtained water from a shared tap in their yard 
and 14.3 percent from an individual household connection. Thus, overwhelmingly the water 
used by households in Addis Ababa is sourced directly or indirectly from the municipal 
system.  
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In Kisumu, privately owned wells were the primary water source for 67.9 percent of 
households. Public water taps or standpipes were the primary water sources for 24.4 percent 
of households. A small percentage (3.8 percent) depended upon handcart delivered water, 
either sourced from a well or public water tap, and 1.3 percent had an individual household 
connection to the municipal system. The entrepreneur running a small-scale water treatment 
plant in the outlying suburb of Nyamasaria was the primary water source for the remaining 
2.6 percent of households surveyed in Kisumu.  
Most households surveyed reported using more than one source of water, with some using as 
many as five different sources, including additional sources such as rainwater during the wet 
season. Distance was the most common factor which determined a household’s primary water 
source, with 64.1 percent of households citing this in Kisumu and 60.0 percent in Addis 
Ababa. Water quality and safety was the second most cited reason for choice of primary 
water supply in Kisumu (21.8 percent) but not a factor in Addis Ababa. Conversely, in Addis 
Ababa the second most cited factor for choice of primary supply (by 28.6 percent of 
households) was the fact that the source used was the only available source.  This was not a 
factor in Kisumu where most households had multiple options available to them. Cost was 
the third most cited factor in both cities, with 11.5 percent of households in Kisumu and 11.4 
percent of households in Addis Ababa citing this as determining the choice of their primary 
water supply.   
In Kisumu where water sourced from both the municipal supply system and wells was 
available, the majority (55.9%) preferred to use water from the municipal system for drinking 
and cooking, with well water used by 39.9 percent, and rainwater or other sources by 3.6 
percent. Well water was preferred by a slight majority (52.5 percent) for non-consumptive 
purposes. In Addis Ababa, households did not appear selective in their use of water for 
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different purposes as ultimately almost all water is sourced from the municipal system so 
there was no distinction in the quality of water from the different sources.  
The quantity of water used by households varied according to the time of the year, with more 
used during the dry season. There was significant variation between the two cities.  In 
Kisumu, mean daily household water consumption was 160 litres in the wet season and 180 
litres in the dry season, or 32 and 36 litres per capita respectively. In Addis Ababa, mean 
daily household water consumption was 80 litres in the wet season and 116 litres in the dry 
season, or 16 and 23.2 litres per capita respectively.   
Costs of water in Addis Ababa and Kisumu varied according to source and time of year. In 
both cities a household connection was the cheapest by volume, while household resale was 
the most expensive in Addis Ababa and handcart delivered water was the most expensive in 
Kisumu (Table 1). 
 Mean cost of water (USD/M3) 
Water source Addis Ababa Kisumu 
Official 
supply 
network 
Household 
connection 
0.18 0.49 
Yard tap 0.67 Not common 
Household resale 2.88 Not common 
Standpipe 0.77 2.23 
Other standpipe Not available 1.86 
Wells Not available 1.15 
Handcart Not available 6.72 
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF MEAN COSTS OF WATER FROM DIFFERENT 
SOURCES ($US / M3). (DATA FROM THE WATER USAGE STUDY OF 310 
HOUSEHOLDS CONDUCTED IN KISUMU AND ADDIS ABABA.) 
 
With per capita water consumption low, the water usage study showed that total household 
spending on water was inevitably also low but remained very significant as a proportion of 
income. In Kisumu, average monthly expenditure on water was $US7.30 in the wet season 
and $US12.80 in the dry season compared to household incomes ranging from $US45 to 
$US60. In Addis Ababa average expenditure was $US2.00 in the wet season and $US3.00 in 
the dry season compared to household incomes ranging from $US12 to $US21. The OECD 
suggests that 3 to 5 percent of income is accepted internationally as affordable 63  thus 
households are spending an excessively disproportionate amount of their income on water 
since spending was far above this level.  
 
A total of 414 water samples, 318 from Kisumu and 96 from Addis Ababa, from various 
sources used by households, were analyzed for the presence of TTCs. The results (Table 2) 
show that the water quality was generally better in Addis Ababa, with the wells of Kisumu 
having a very high failure rate in relation to the drinking water guidelines of WHO and the 
standards of Kenya and Ethiopia of zero detection of TTC per 100ml sample64. 
Water source Number of Positive TCC detects (%) 
                                                             
63  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing Water For All: An OECD Perspective 
on Pricing and Financing: Key Messages for Policy Makers’ (OECD, 2009),< 
http://www.oecd.org/env/42350563.pdf  > accessed  6 October 2013. 
64 World Health Organization (n 14) 284. 
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samples Kisumu Addis Ababa Combined 
All samples 414 84.0 40.2 73.7 
Tap (standpipe / house tap) 81 26.1 20.0 23.5 
Well 98 96.9 100 96.9 
Handcart container 39 69.2 - 69.2 
Household storage 184 100 51.9 86.4 
Borehole 6 50.0 25.0 66.7 
Tanker 3 0 0 0 
Spring  4 - 50.0 50.0 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF THE MICROBIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
WATER SAMPLES TAKEN IN KISUMU AND ADDIS ABABA. 
In the water usage questionnaires, households were asked whether they ever treated their 
water, with 74.4 percent in Kisumu and 26.6 percent in Addis Ababa indicating that they did. 
Chlorination was the main method used in Kisumu while boiling was the main method used 
in Addis Ababa. Given that 100 percent of samples taken from household storage containers 
in Kisumu and 51.9 percent in Addis Ababa exceeded WHO guideline values for the 
presence of TTC, the treatment processes households say they are practicing were not being 
particularly effective. No more effective is the practice in Kisumu of storing separately water 
from different sources in order to use just the higher quality (and supposedly safer but more 
expensive) tap water for consumptive purposes.  
When the microbiological quality of piped water in Kisumu was examined along the supply 
chain it was shown that the deterioration in water quality did not occur during transportation 
by handcart delivery, but occurred primarily during household storage. While the difference 
                                                             
 There was only one well sample from Addis Ababa. 
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in microbiological quality was statistically significant (p<0.001) between tap water and 
household storage, there was no statistically significant difference between the tap water and 
handcart containers (p=0.735) or tankers (p=0.640).  
The Kenyan water sector has undergone significant reform in recent years with the enactment 
of the Water Act 2002. 65 . This Act has created, or envisages the creation of, several 
institutions, including the Water Resources Management Authority, the Water Services 
Regulatory Board, Water Service Boards, the Water Services Trust Fund, the Water Appeals 
Board and Water Service Providers. Water Service Boards are licensed to provide water 
services, with their activities regulated by the national regulatory authority, the Water 
Services Regulatory Board. Water Service Boards are required to engage Water Service 
Providers to operate the water supply system within defined areas within their jurisdiction.  
Within this framework for the supply and management of water services, the Water Act 2002 
does not contain any provisions that expressly deal with SIPs.  The licensing system that it 
establishes, however, operates on the basis that the supply of water in quantities over certain 
amounts is made subject to a license. Section 56 of the Water Act 2002 sets out a requirement 
for a license and states:  
 No person shall, within the limits of supply of a licensee (a) provide water 
services to more than twenty households; or (b) supply – (i) more than 
twenty-five thousand liters of water a day for domestic purposes; or (ii) 
more than one hundred thousand liters of water a day for any purpose, 
                                                             
65  Albert Mumma, ‘Kenya’s New Water Law: An Analysis of the Implications for the Rural 
Poor’.(International Workshop on ‘African Water Laws: Plural Legislative Frameworks for Rural Water 
Management in Africa (26-28 January 2005, Johannesburg, South Africa)  
<http://www.nri.org/waterlaw/AWLworkshop/MUMMA-A.pdf> accessed 6 October 2013. 
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except under the authority of a license. A person who provides water 
services in contravention of this section shall be guilty of an offence.  
Further to this, section 57 of the Water Act 2002 provides that only the Water Services 
Boards may apply for licenses thus giving them monopoly rights within the geographic areas 
in which they are mandated to operate.  Any person, therefore, would be committing an 
offence under this provision if they supplied water in excess of the specified limits if doing so 
in an area where a Water Services Board has already been granted a license. Kisumu falls 
within the jurisdiction of the LVSWSB that  has made a service provision agreement for the 
operation of the water supply infrastructure in Kisumu with KIWASCO. So, the effect of 
these provisions is that anyone can supply water (without a license) if they do so below the 
quantitative limits.  Above these limits, a licence is required, but only the Water Services 
Boards have power to apply for such licenses.  The criteria used by the regulator to decide 
whether or not to grant a licence to the Water Services Boards relate to the technical, 
financial, managerial and commercial capacity of not only the applicant Water Services 
Board, but also the Water Service Providers engaged by the Board. All areas of Kenya have 
established Water Services Boards. Given the water supply limits imposed by the Water Act 
2002, it follows that almost all well and borehole operators and mobile water vendors are 
operating illegally since they do not have the authorization of the LVSWSB in the form of a 
service provision agreement.  Above the limits only the licensee and anyone they authorize 
can supply water; below the limits anyone can supply water.  So, the regulatory framework 
established by the Water Act 2002 does contemplate a mixed supply of water.  But, a 
handcart operator is likely to support more than 20 households per day during busy periods, 
while a tanker trucker could be expected to supply approximately 50,000 litres of water for 
domestic purposes each day. A well or borehole operator, if they sold water to a single 
handcart operator, is likely to supply more than twenty households a day and also to exceed 
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the volumetric constraints imposed by the Water Act 2002. Ironically, the LVSWSB (in 
common with all other Water Services Boards) as the monopoly licensee and as agent of 
KIWASCO, is insulated from competition in circumstances where it is not able to provide a 
full service to its customers. 
Currently, and inevitably as a result of the above provision, the price and quality of the water 
provided by illegally operating SIPs are not regulated. The exception to this lack of 
regulation is the standpipe operators who have a contractual relationship with KIWASCO and 
are expected to adhere to a recommended retail price. Only some standpipes are currently 
allowed to operate by the LVSWSB as they have relevant service provision agreements with 
KIWASCO and purchase their water in bulk at a flat rate.  However, price control is not 
being actively enforced so in practice, price regulation is completely absent, as is the 
regulation of water quality.  
In 2000, the federal government of Ethiopia enacted the Water Resources Proclamation.66 
One of the provisions of this proclamation states:  
…. no person shall perform the following activities without having obtained a permit from the Supervising 
body: (a) construct waterworks; (b) supply water, whether for his own or for others; (c) transfer water which 
he/she abstracted from a water resource or received from another supplier… 
While some activities are exempted from this provision none seem to be significant for the 
legal operations of SIPs. Apart from this and other minor provisions, the Proclamation does 
not contain detailed rules on the regulation of water providers. There is no framework law 
that provides conditions under which the private sector can be involved in the supply of 
water, with the function of water supply belonging to regional and local government.  
                                                             
66 Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation 2000, <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/eth44004.pdf> 
accessed  6 October 2013 
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The Water Resources Proclamation requires permits for water supply across the country, 
however, in Addis Ababa such a permit is unlikely to be granted since the law which 
established the city’s water authority clearly prohibits the supply or resale of water. The only 
exceptions to this are official standpipes operated under an agreement with the water 
authority. Apart from the licensed standpipes, there are in existence water kiosks and 
neighbour sellers who are clearly operating in contravention of the law. The legal provisions 
that prohibit such activities are not actively enforced but the tariff structure employed by the 
water authority (with the exception of the licensed standpipes) is expected to discourage the 
resale of water due to a progressively increasing tariff rate being applied that makes the water 
more expensive when taken in larger volumes. Due to the existence of unlicensed water 
vending not being acknowledged and therefore operating outside the law, there are no 
controls on the price or quality of the water provided by water vendors.  
6.  DISCUSSION  
The sources of water for the water vendors in Addis Ababa and Kisumu differ.  In Addis 
Ababa, they are wholly dependent upon the municipal supply system as their source, but in 
Kisumu, vendors sell water from privately owned boreholes and wells in addition to reselling 
municipal supplied water. Water drawn from these boreholes and wells in Kisumu is 
significantly lower in quality than municipal supplied water and is not, therefore, the 
preferred source by a majority of customers for drinking. But, this well and borehole water 
plays an important role in bringing total average water consumption in Kisumu up to an 
acceptable level where it is used for non-consumptive purposes. Our water usage study which 
formed part of the research project67 showed that whereas average daily water consumption 
in areas un-served or poorly served by the official water utility in Addis Ababa is an 
inadequate 14.6 litres per capita per day, in equivalent areas in Kisumu, it is twice as much at 
                                                             
67 (n 3). 
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34 litres per capita per day.  A caveat to the advantages of an increased supply is the extent to 
which this means that Kisumu households are at risk of drinking poor quality water.   
 
The water usage analysis suggests that mobile water vendors do not cause significant 
deterioration in water quality between the point of collection and the point of delivery. They 
supply water in a similar state to what it was in when they collected it from their supplier.  
This is not surprising as there are no significant delays in the supply chain and the water 
containers are kept in a reasonably clean state given that they are on public display and are 
viewed by the customers.  In common with the results of other studies,68 the most significant 
deterioration in water quality occurred during household storage.  Such household storage – a 
common feature of these communities in developing countries - results from a lack of (or 
insecure) piped supplies. 
Mobile water vendors, (the SIPs who operate at the final point of the informal supply chain), 
engaged in the delivery of water from source to door, do not necessarily provide water of 
inadequate quality or of a worse quality than their source which may already be 
contaminated.  But, their activities are essential, effectively extending the coverage of the 
municipal water system in developing countries into underserved and un-served areas. This 
compensates for the intermittent municipal supply for those with piped water and saves the 
                                                             
68 Eric Mintz, Fred Reiff, & Robert Tauxe, ‘Safe Water Treatment and Storage in the Home: A Practical New 
Strategy to Prevent Waterborne Disease’ (1995) 273 J of the American Medical Association, 948; Stephen 
Gundry, Jim Wright & Ronan Conroy, ‘Household Drinking Water in Developing Countries: A Systematic 
Review of Microbiological Contamination Between Source and Point-of-use’ (2004) 2 J of Water and Health 1.  
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time and energy of the customers both in informal settlements and middle-income housing by 
bringing the water to their door.  
 
While household expenditure on water is commonly very high amongst low income 
households, this does not appear to be due to profiteering amongst water vendors. Indeed, the 
relatively low entry barriers and large numbers of vendors, market forces and competition 
between vendors, makes exploitation difficult, with the incomes of water vendors relative to 
other informal sector jobs confirming this. In Addis Ababa, for example, the average net 
income for a standpipe operator is estimated to be $US7.80 per month and thus falls below 
the official poverty line. In Kisumu, the average net monthly income of a standpipe operator 
is $US97.02, however, incomes are variable and ranged from as low as $US22.39 per month 
to as high as $US447.80 per month amongst standpipe operators in Kisumu. (The official 
poverty line in Kenya is $150 per month for a household.) Handcart vendors’ incomes vary 
between $US183.58 and $828.38 per month, reflecting the hard physical labour of this job. 
While some SIPs have incomes below the poverty line of Kenya, most earn incomes 
comparable with earnings in other informal sector jobs. SIPs appear to provide a competitive 
service for the urban poor rather than exploitative of that sector. Mobile water vendors, for 
instance provide water to the more difficult to serve consumers through labour intensive 
processes and they  inevitably face higher supply costs which they pass on to their customers.  
 
While government agencies have engaged with water vendors in some countries with some 
success, progress has for the most part been limited in part due to a lack of formal recognition 
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of SIPs69. Focus group sessions70 with  SIPs showed that they did not dismiss the idea of their 
activities being regulated (although they preferred this to be done by some form of voluntary 
regulation – a desire frequently to be found amongst most stakeholders in any business or 
industry).  But they did recognize the critical importance of controls on quality in relation to 
public health concerns.  Hence, there is a case to be made for formally recognizing SIPs due 
to the vital role they play in helping people meet their basic water needs and the need to 
ensure drinking water quality. This may also include regulating the price of water charged by 
standpipe operators who benefit from a favorable tariff from the water utility. For other types 
of SIPs, the case for price regulation is weak.  They do not benefit from subsidies and thus 
setting prices below the market rate would be likely to drive such vendors out of business 
with the consequent risk of reduction in the water supply.  
 
Regulation of water quality and the implementation of other measures to improve human 
health are very relevant to the attainment of the human rights to life and to water and 
represent an urgent finding of the study where the supply of water is, in large part, delivered 
by SIPs. The water usage study showed that in Kisumu, most wells currently fail to meet the 
WHO drinking-water quality guidelines,71 but the supply of well water helps boost water 
supply to households for non-consumptive purposes to an acceptable level. So, this source of 
water aids quantity albeit failing on the quality front.  It therefore fails to assist in the 
achievement of the MDGs as it does not provide access to an ‘improved water source’.  The 
semi-structured interviews and survey of households in Kisumu showed that where possible 
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70 Three focus group discussions took place (n 51).    
71 World Health Organization (n14). 
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people are careful to use the lower quality but cheaper well water for non-potable uses while 
using municipal water for drinking.  However, where water is bought from handcart vendors 
rather than directly from a well or municipal standpipe, households cannot be completely sure 
of its origin. Given that point-of-use water quality interventions have been shown to produce 
better health outcomes than water supply or source treatment72, educating households about 
safe water storage and treatment options may produce a better outcome than prohibiting 
water vendors and depriving many households of their main water source. Regulation is 
needed to ensure that water vendors follow best practice guidelines so that water consumers 
dependent upon their services can have more confidence in the safety of the water supplied. 
In part, this could be achieved by improving the implementation of good practice guidelines 
for the design and operation of wells.   Further guidelines could be established for water 
vendors, in addition to routine water quality testing and random inspection of mobile water 
vendors to ensure proper description of the source of water and thus prevent mis-selling.  
 
The regulatory frameworks which were analyzed as part of this project demonstrate the fact, 
common to many developing countries, that SIPs are excluded from formal regulatory 
frameworks which were devised to regulate bulk supply by monopoly providers.   It is true 
that long-term and permanent improvements to municipal systems can be achieved.  
Evidence shows that this can be achievable in a relatively short period of time.  In Phnom 
Penh, for example, service coverage increased from 38 percent to 90 percent of the 
population and from 10 hours to 24 hours per day between 1993 and 2008 where the reforms 
of the post-war Cambodian government resulted in radical change.  The Phnom Penh Water 
Supply Authority was turned into a model public water utility with a 24-hour drinking water 
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service, subsidies to the poor through connection fees and tariffs, the supply of non-revenue 
water reduced to 6%, and successful collection of bills at a rate of 99%.73 Without such 
governmental commitment, long term objectives to achieve a total municipal system may 
involve expensive engineering solutions which may be prohibitive or politically unachievable 
in the foreseeable future; in the meantime, people are left without the fulfillment of their 
basic rights.   
 
Solutions need to recognize the reality of the situation and be designed for potential 
longevity.  The transplant of Western legal approaches to solve a developing world problem 
is plain to see in the nature of the legal provisions that were analyzed.  Developing countries 
are routinely involved in legal transplants borrowing expertise from the industrialised world 
in devising written constitutions74 , governance structures, property rights 75  and business 
models. For example, in developing a range of frameworks for the regulation of public and 
environmental health and pollution, developing countries look to models in existence in the 
industrialised world – models which may have their roots in nineteenth century legislation76 
when wealth and prosperity was being built through industrial development against a 
background of social stability.77  The background in many developing countries does not 
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reflect such prevailing circumstances. Social and political instability and levels of 
corruption78 mean that even where infrastructures have been developed, the failure to repair, 
renew and maintain is endemic. The transplant of a Western regulatory model that depends 
on such levels of social stability, independent legal systems and effective enforcement 
regimes, is highly likely to be ineffective.79  Indeed, where social and economic structures 
become over-extended in the developed world, its own regulatory models can frequently 
fail.80   The management of water supply is an example where developing countries have 
sought to transplant such regulatory frameworks. 81  The Kenyan Water Act 2002 is an 
example of this phenomenon in that it assumes bulk supply and excludes from its provisions 
the activities of SIPs. Regulatory frameworks reflecting practice from developed countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Judicial Conservatism’ (2006) JEL 35; Rosalind Malcolm and John Pointing, Statutory Nuisance Law and 
Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2011) Chapter 3. 
78 Glenn Hollands, Corruption in Infrastructure Delivery - South Africa: Case study (WEDC South Africa  
2007); Purusottam Man Shrestha, Corruption in Infrastructure Provision and Service Delivery at the Municipal 
Level in Nepal: Case Study (WEDC Kathmandu Nepal 2007); Transparency International, Global Corruption 
Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector (CUP 2008).  
79 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press 
1974);  Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 MLR 1; William Ewald, 
'Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants' (1995), 43 American J of Comparative L 489;  
Michele Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 2007). 
80 Note the regulatory failures in the case of food, see Matthew Taylor ‘Horsemeat Scandal: Government 
Warned Two Years Ago’, The Guardian (London, 17 February 2013) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/feb/17/horsemeat-scandal-government-warned-claim accessed  6 October 
2013. 
81 See, for example, Colin Kirkpatrick, David Parker and Yin-Fang Zhang, ‘Price and Profit Regulation in 
Developing and Transition Economies: A Survey of the Regulators’ (2005) Public Money and Management 99. 
38 
 
may not work within developing countries for a variety of reasons.82 For instance, the nature 
of the economic actors to be regulated may be different. In developed countries, national 
regulatory frameworks for water provision are developed taking into account that the 
regulated are relatively large conventional utilities.83 Even where in the industrialised world, 
non-state (or quasi-state) actors are used and key utilities industries are privatised, such 
industrial concerns are frequently the antithesis of local small businesses.84  More usually, 
they are multi-national concerns that bid across state boundaries for service contracts within a 
regulatory framework which is designed for large conventional utilities. And it is true that 
almost all of the populations of industrialised countries are served by these utilities and thus 
the equivalent of SIPs, simply do not exist. The reality in developing countries is however 
markedly different. SIPs are completely different from conventional Western utilities in their 
size and business models yet serve large sections of the community as do conventional 
utilities in industrialised countries. Therefore, to transplant a Western regulatory framework, 
which is suited to conventional bulk supply utilities, into developing countries, will not 
achieve its purpose. In making such transplants, attention should be directed at the practical 
reality of the diverse nature of the regulated industry in the host country. 
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The coexistence of formal and informal providers has a long history and a key argument for 
the regulation of SIPs is the need to recognize the reality of the current situation for water 
supply in many urban and peri-urban settlements.  Steps must be taken to regulate to achieve 
improvements in water quality, improve public health and prevent further environmental 
degradation represented by the uncontrolled development of water sources.85  The regulatory 
culture necessary to implement these steps must reflect the reality of the supply system in 
developing countries and not seek to transplant Western regulatory frameworks devised for 
bulk supply.  
 
7 .  C O N C L U S I O N  
Extending the coverage, improving the reliability of municipal systems and ensuring 
affordable access by the urban poor to such systems is an ideal solution to water supply 
problems in many developing countries. But technically expensive solutions, turbulent 
political backgrounds, and levels of corruption preventing public service solutions to 
environmental health problems, all operate as barriers to the development of municipal 
service provisions.  It remains the case that, until municipal solutions are achieved, ignoring 
the part played by SIPs is potentially misleading as it fails to consider the very significant 
role being played by these vendors in filling gaps left in the piped water system. The virtual 
pipe system that they provide needs to be formally recognized and brought within the 
regulatory framework.  Undesirable as this may at first sight appear to those SIPs in our study 
who viewed regulation as a burden, nevertheless, such a step would enable SIPs to operate in 
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a stable fashion without fear of sudden closure or seizure of equipment.  Formal recognition 
bringing such stability would encourage investment and development thus enabling the 
improvement of the water provision.  An approach recognizing the existence of small scale 
providers which brought oversight and control through an effective enforcement regime 
would assist in the improvement of safe drinking water sources.  In both countries examined 
as part of the study, registration of drinking water sources and inspection are already 
elements of the regulatory framework and bringing those aspects to bear in relation to SIPs 
would improve the availability of safe drinking water.  Currently, in Kenya, the regulatory 
frameworks exclude low throughput of water supply thus leaving many SIPs outside the 
regulatory framework.  In Ethiopia, there is a general failure to acknowledge and recognize 
the existence of SIPs.  An adaptation of existing laws so as to recognize the operational 
importance of the supply chain in developing countries would achieve formal recognition of 
SIPs. Extending current provisions to the low throughput supply nature of SIPs and bringing 
them generally into the extant regulatory framework, while not being without cost, would be 
an effective mechanism for improving the security and safety of the drinking water supply. 
Formally recognizing SIPs and thereby enabling them to receive training and education from 
the enforcement agencies – an important activity of regulators - will enhance quality. Once 
recognized and registered as formal operators, good practice guidelines for such matters as 
the operation of wells and boreholes could be integrated into requisite training for such SIPs. 
A necessary system of random or risk-based inspection specifically devised for SIPs, of the 
unimproved and most vulnerable water sources, would help to reduce health risks within the 
water supply chain.  Ignoring the existence of SIPs and leaving them as a largely unregulated 
industry exposes large sections of population to risk and harm to health. The MDG seeks to 
achieve access to safe drinking water through improved water sources.  Controlling the 
unimproved water sources represented in the supply chain of SIPs, which are relied on by 
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large numbers of people in the urban areas of developing countries, through registration, 
inspection, education and training of the operators, would enable real progress towards the 
satisfaction of this Goal.  An overall aim of the concept of sustainable development is to 
achieve equity between the peoples of the developing and industrialized worlds and ensuring 
a basic standard in respect of the provision of safe drinking water is a pre-requisite to its 
attainment.  A step in that direction is the fulfillment of the MDGs and realization of the 
human right to water which will be enhanced by measures for the integration of SIPs and 
their essential virtual supply system into regulatory frameworks. 
 
 
 
